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Godmode — agentic threat model

9.5AIVSS 9.5 · Critical

Godmode presents a high agentic risk profile due to its integration of highly autonomous frameworks like Auto-GPT and BabyAGI, which perform multi-step planning and tool execution. Without explicit sandboxing or guardrail details in the listing, the potential for unintended tool execution or infinite loops remains a significant concern.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.5AARS uplift 0.98Factor sum 6.5/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.80
Goal-Driven Planning
0.90
Self-Modification
0.60
Dynamic Tool Use
0.80
Persistent Memory
0.70
Contextual Awareness
0.60
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.40
Non-Determinism
0.80
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.70

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models✓ mapped

Utilizes GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 as foundation models. Primary threats include prompt injection, adversarial reprogramming, and misaligned outputs that could hijack the autonomous agent's goal-planning loop.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Godmode likely processes user-provided files or web search data for market analysis, but its exact vector database, RAG pipeline architecture, or data isolation mechanisms are not specified.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Integrates Auto-GPT and BabyAGI frameworks. These orchestrators are highly vulnerable to tool misuse, infinite execution loops, and memory poisoning if malicious inputs are ingested during web browsing or task execution.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — As a web-based platform running autonomous agents, secure sandboxing of agent execution environments is critical to prevent container escape or host compromise, but infrastructure details are not disclosed.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The platform does not specify its logging, monitoring, or guardrail mechanisms for tracking autonomous agent steps or detecting anomalous behavior.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2, ISO) or enterprise-grade identity and access management controls are mentioned in the public directory.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While it hosts autonomous agents, it is unclear if it supports multi-agent collaboration protocols or a third-party agent marketplace.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.