Jared Montgomery — agentic threat model
Jared Montgomery is a low-risk, specialized resale assistant focused on analyzing thrifted items. Its primary risks are limited to inaccurate valuations due to data poisoning or prompt injection, with no direct transactional or autonomous execution capabilities.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.30 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely relies on a commercial vision-language model to analyze images of thrifted items. Threats include prompt injection to manipulate valuation outputs or bypass content filters.
Not certain from the listing — requires access to real-time sales data (e.g., eBay, Poshmark APIs). Threats include data poisoning of the external sales databases or API scraping/exfiltration of proprietary valuation models.
Not certain from the listing — orchestration likely involves simple tool-calling for search APIs. Threats include insecure tool integration if the search queries are not sanitized, leading to injection attacks.
Not certain from the listing — presumably hosted as a web or mobile application. Standard cloud infrastructure threats apply, such as insecure API endpoints or exposed environment variables.
Not certain from the listing — no monitoring or guardrails are described. Lack of observability could lead to undetected drift in valuation accuracy or silent failures in data retrieval.
Not certain from the listing — no compliance certifications or user authentication mechanisms are detailed. Risks include unauthorized access to user search histories.
Not certain from the listing — operates as a standalone assistant with no indicated multi-agent or marketplace integrations.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.