Maige — agentic threat model
Maige presents a moderate agentic risk primarily driven by its write-access integration with GitHub APIs, where prompt injection via malicious issue descriptions could lead to unauthorized labeling, triage manipulation, or metadata exposure.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.60 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.30 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.50 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.40 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation models are not specified. However, they are susceptible to indirect prompt injection via untrusted user input in GitHub issues, potentially causing the model to ignore triage instructions.
Not certain from the listing — Data operations and vector stores are not detailed. There is a risk of data poisoning if the agent uses historical issues/comments as a RAG source, allowing attackers to inject malicious context.
Maige orchestrates issue labeling and prioritization based on customizable instructions. The primary threat is tool misuse (GitHub API calls) triggered by prompt injection within issue bodies, leading to unauthorized issue modification or spamming.
Not certain from the listing — Hosting and sandboxing details are omitted. The deployment must securely isolate the GitHub OAuth tokens and API secrets to prevent privilege escalation or lateral movement if the hosting environment is compromised.
Not certain from the listing — No evaluation, guardrails, or observability stack is mentioned. Without input/output guardrails, the agent cannot reliably detect or block adversarial prompt injections embedded in GitHub issues.
Not certain from the listing — Compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2) are not stated. Security relies heavily on the principle of least privilege applied to the GitHub App's OAuth scopes (limiting write access strictly to issues and labels).
Not certain from the listing — No multi-agent coordination is described. However, cascading failures could occur if Maige's automated labeling triggers other repository webhooks or CI/CD automation workflows.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.