AgentReadyHomeAgent ListingPricing

← Meet In The Middle

Meet In The Middle — agentic threat model

5.2AIVSS 5.2 · Medium

The 'Meet In The Middle' agent presents low agentic risk due to its read-only nature and lack of autonomous execution capabilities like booking or payments. Primary risks are limited to user location privacy and potential manipulation of suggested meeting venues via prompt injection or API poisoning.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 4.3AARS uplift 0.87Factor sum 1.6/10Threat ×0.95Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.10
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.30
Persistent Memory
0.10
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.30
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.20

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely uses a lightweight LLM or heuristic parser to interpret user location queries. Threats include prompt injection designed to hijack the recommendation engine or redirect users to malicious coordinates.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — processes real-time user location coordinates and queries external mapping/venue databases. Threats include the leakage of sensitive user location history and potential poisoning of upstream venue data (e.g., spoofed reviews or malicious venue links).

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates API calls to calculate travel times and fetch venue details. Threats include insecure integration with third-party mapping APIs and lack of input validation on coordinates passed to external tools.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted as a closed-source web application. Threats include standard web infrastructure vulnerabilities, lack of sandboxing for query processing, and potential exposure of backend API keys for mapping services.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no mention of logging, guardrails, or observability tools to monitor for anomalous queries or malicious inputs designed to break the optimization algorithm.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no explicit privacy policies or compliance frameworks (such as GDPR for handling precise location data) are detailed in the public directory.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates as a standalone vertical utility with no apparent multi-agent collaboration or ecosystem integrations, minimizing cascading ecosystem risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.