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NEST AI — agentic threat model

9.5AIVSS 9.5 · Critical

NEST AI presents a high-risk profile due to its autonomous execution capabilities in the DeFi space (DeFAI) combined with a closed-source architecture and lack of disclosed security controls, making it highly susceptible to financial loss via prompt injection or oracle manipulation.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 8.5AARS uplift 0.97Factor sum 5.9/10Threat ×1.1Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.90
Goal-Driven Planning
0.70
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.80
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.80
Dynamic Identity
0.40
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.20
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.80

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes commercial or open-weights LLMs to interpret user intents and generate DeFi strategies. Key threats include prompt injection attacks that could trick the model into generating malicious transaction payloads or misaligned financial advice.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — requires real-time market data feeds, smart contract ABIs, and historical DeFi data. Vulnerable to data poisoning or oracle manipulation, which could lead the agent to execute trades based on fabricated price points.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates planning and tool execution to interact with DeFi protocols. Insecure tool integration or lack of strict schema validation could allow attackers to hijack tool calls to drain connected Web3 wallets.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted in a closed-source environment. The primary infrastructure threat is the secure storage and management of cryptographic private keys or API credentials used to sign blockchain transactions.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no monitoring, logging, or transaction guardrails are mentioned. Without real-time anomaly detection, malicious or erroneous high-value transactions could execute silently without administrative intervention.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — being closed-source and free, there is no evidence of formal security audits, SOC2 compliance, or strict identity and access management (IAM) controls for user wallets.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates within the broader DeFi ecosystem. It faces cascading risks from interacting with external, potentially malicious smart contracts, decentralized exchanges, or compromised liquidity pools.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.