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OpenAI Codex — agentic threat model

8.2AIVSS 8.2 · High

OpenAI Codex acts primarily as a stateless code-generation foundation model rather than an autonomous agent, meaning its direct agentic risk is low; however, its downstream risk is high if generated code is executed without human-in-the-loop validation or sandboxing.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.8AARS uplift 0.44Factor sum 2.0/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.10
Goal-Driven Planning
0.10
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.10
Persistent Memory
0.00
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.70

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models✓ mapped

As an advanced code-generation foundation model, Codex is highly susceptible to adversarial prompt injection (indirect injection via comments/code) and model reprogramming, which can force the model to output malicious or backdoored code.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — training data operations and ingestion pipelines are proprietary, but the model faces significant risks of training data poisoning where malicious actors intentionally submit public code containing subtle vulnerabilities.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Codex is a model rather than an agent framework, but insecure integration by developers (e.g., passing Codex outputs directly to an exec() function) represents a severe tool-misuse threat.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosting infrastructure for the API and interactive demos is not detailed, but requires strict sandboxing to prevent arbitrary code execution during live demo interactions.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — guardrails and output filtering mechanisms are not specified, creating blind spots where insecure, vulnerable, or plagiarized code could be generated without detection.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — compliance alignments (such as SOC2 or EU AI Act) are not mentioned, raising potential compliance and intellectual property risks regarding copyright/licensing of generated code.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no multi-agent ecosystem or marketplace interactions are described, though downstream integration into IDEs and developer workflows creates a wide attack surface.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.