← OpenClaw Market Intelligence
OpenClaw Market Intelligence — agentic threat model
OpenClaw Market Intelligence acts as a financial decision-support dashboard. While it does not directly execute trades, its reliance on unauthenticated webhooks and external social/news feeds exposes it to data poisoning and prompt injection that could lead to severe financial misinformation.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.40 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.50 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.60 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — the specific LLMs powering the OpenClaw predictions and chat are undisclosed. Threats include prompt injection via ingested social signals or news feeds, which could manipulate trading predictions.
Not certain from the listing — the underlying database for portfolio tracking and news ingestion is unspecified. Threats include data poisoning of the alerts feed and portfolio database via manipulated external data sources.
The agent utilizes the OpenClaw framework and exposes an HTTP POST webhook receiver to ingest stock picks. This interface is highly vulnerable to insecure tool integration, arbitrary data injection, and state manipulation if the webhook payload is not strictly validated.
Not certain from the listing — the hosting environment for the web dashboard is not detailed. However, the connection to a 'local OpenClaw project' suggests a hybrid local/remote architecture, risking exposed local services and unauthorized network access if the webhook port is publicly accessible.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of guardrails, prediction validation, or anomaly detection for the incoming alerts and news feeds, creating a blind spot for adversarial manipulation of market intelligence.
Not certain from the listing — no authentication, authorization, or encryption mechanisms are described for the dashboard or the HTTP POST webhook receiver, presenting a high risk of unauthorized data access and spoofed predictions.
The dashboard relies on a multi-component ecosystem, receiving data from a local OpenClaw project and external feeds. This creates a risk of trust abuse, where a compromise of the local project or external news source cascades directly into the dashboard, displaying fraudulent stock picks.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.