AgentReadyHomeAgent ListingPricing

← Origami Agents

Origami Agents — agentic threat model

7.6AIVSS 7.6 · High

Origami Agents poses a moderate security risk primarily driven by its autonomous web-browsing capabilities, which expose the system to indirect prompt injection and data poisoning from untrusted external web sources during lead harvesting.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 5.8AARS uplift 1.81Factor sum 4.3/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.70
Goal-Driven Planning
0.60
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.50
Persistent Memory
0.30
Contextual Awareness
0.50
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.30
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes commercial LLMs for parsing web content and determining lead intent. The primary threat is indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in target websites hijack the model's behavior.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — aggregates and stores lead data from various online sources. Vulnerable to data poisoning if target websites host fraudulent or malicious information designed to corrupt the lead database.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates web navigation and data extraction. Vulnerable to tool misuse, such as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if the agent is manipulated into requesting internal or malicious URLs.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted as a closed-source SaaS. Requires robust sandboxing of the web-browsing environment to prevent remote code execution or host compromise from malicious web pages.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — requires continuous monitoring to detect scraping failures, IP blocks, and drift in lead qualification accuracy. No explicit observability or guardrail frameworks are mentioned.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — processes potential PII (lead contact details), raising compliance risks under GDPR and CCPA. No security certifications or compliance audits are cited in the directory listing.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates primarily as a standalone research tool. Risks are limited unless integrated directly with downstream CRM platforms where compromised lead data could exploit CRM vulnerabilities.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.