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Sectricity RedSOC Platform — agentic threat model

8.7AIVSS 8.7 · High

The Sectricity RedSOC Platform presents a high-risk profile due to its autonomous, offensive security capabilities. If compromised or misconfigured, its ability to plan and execute simulated attacks could be weaponized to perform unauthorized network exploitation.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 9.1AARS uplift 0.54Factor sum 5.7/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×0.9
Autonomy of Action
0.80
Goal-Driven Planning
0.80
Self-Modification
0.20
Dynamic Tool Use
0.80
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.70
Dynamic Identity
0.50
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.30
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The specific LLMs or foundation models used for generating attack strategies or analyzing outputs are not disclosed. Potential threats include prompt injection leading to unauthorized scanning or model reprogramming to bypass safety guardrails.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The data pipeline, vulnerability databases, or RAG sources used to inform the offensive agent are unspecified. Threats include poisoning of the vulnerability knowledge base or exfiltration of target network topology data.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

The orchestration framework manages the planning of offensive security tasks and tool execution. Threats include tool misuse (e.g., executing destructive exploits instead of non-intrusive checks) and insecure tool integration where malicious target responses hijack the agent's execution flow.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment (on-premise vs. SaaS) and sandboxing of the execution environment are not detailed. Threats include container escape during exploit execution or unauthorized lateral movement from the RedSOC platform into the target network.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The monitoring, logging, and guardrails to ensure the 'non-intrusive' nature of the scans are not specified. Threats include blind spots in logging which could allow the agent to perform unauthorized destructive actions without detection.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

The platform is designed as an open-source, freemium offensive security tool. Threats include lack of strict authorization controls, allowing unauthorized users to launch attacks against arbitrary targets, violating compliance frameworks.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — It is unclear if RedSOC interacts with other external agents or marketplaces. Threats include rogue agent interactions or cascading failures if integrated with automated defensive agents (BlueSOC tools) without proper alignment.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.