Smithery — agentic threat model
Smithery acts as a centralized hub and hosting platform for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, presenting a significant supply chain risk where compromised or malicious tools could be distributed to and executed by agentic systems.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.90 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.70 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — Smithery is an integration and hosting platform for MCP servers rather than a foundation model provider, so model-specific threats depend entirely on the external LLMs developers connect to it.
Not certain from the listing — While Smithery simplifies connecting agents to external data sources via MCP, the platform's own data operations, vector stores, and ingestion security controls are not detailed.
Smithery directly impacts agent frameworks by providing standardized interfaces for tool integration and configurations. Vulnerabilities here include insecure tool integration schemas and the potential execution of malicious tool calls via compromised MCP servers.
Because Smithery offers hosting and distribution services for MCP servers, infrastructure security is critical. Compromise of the hosting environment could lead to container escape, privilege escalation, or unauthorized access to developer environments integrating these servers.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, evaluation, or guardrails to monitor the behavior, inputs, or outputs of the hosted MCP servers.
Not certain from the listing — The directory does not outline identity management, authentication, authorization policies, or compliance certifications (like SOC2) for accessing or publishing to the registry.
As a centralized hub and marketplace for discovering MCP servers, Smithery is highly exposed to ecosystem threats, particularly supply chain attacks where malicious or compromised agents/tools are published and trusted transitively by other systems.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.