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Stockimg.ai — agentic threat model

8.7AIVSS 8.7 · High

Stockimg.ai presents a moderate-to-high risk profile primarily due to its write-access integration with multiple social media platforms, where compromised credentials or prompt injections could lead to automated, brand-damaging content dissemination.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.5AARS uplift 1.18Factor sum 4.5/10Threat ×1.05Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.70
Goal-Driven Planning
0.50
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.70
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.50
Dynamic Identity
0.30
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes third-party text and image generation models (e.g., Stable Diffusion, GPT-4). Primary threats include prompt injection leading to the generation of offensive, copyrighted, or brand-damaging media, and model alignment failures.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — processes user-uploaded brand assets, historical social media data, and generated media. Threats include unauthorized access to proprietary marketing assets and potential data leakage of unreleased campaign materials.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates the generation, scheduling, and posting workflow. Threats include insecure tool integration where the scheduling agent could be manipulated to post unauthorized content or bypass user approval queues.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted as a closed-source SaaS platform. The most critical threat at this layer is the insecure storage of third-party social media OAuth tokens and API keys, which if compromised, grant direct access to client social accounts.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — requires robust content guardrails and output validation to prevent automated posting of toxic or hallucinated content. Gaps in observability could allow silent failures in automated posting schedules.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — requires strict multi-tenant isolation and role-based access control (RBAC) for team accounts. Compliance risks include violating social media platform terms of service regarding automated spam or coordinated inauthentic behavior.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — interacts directly with external social media platform APIs (e.g., Meta, X, LinkedIn). Threats include API deprecations, rate-limiting denial of service, and cascading failures if downstream platform APIs reject automated payloads.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.