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SuiGPT — agentic threat model

7.4AIVSS 7.4 · High

SuiGPT presents a moderate agentic risk profile; while it lacks autonomous execution capabilities on-chain, its role as a Web3 code generator and auditing assistant introduces high integrity risks if users blindly trust its non-deterministic decompilation and vulnerability analysis.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.5AARS uplift 0.95Factor sum 2.7/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.20
Goal-Driven Planning
0.30
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.20
Persistent Memory
0.20
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models✓ mapped

SuiGPT leverages advanced LLMs to translate bytecode to Move code. The primary threats are adversarial bytecode inputs designed to exploit the model, and hallucinated or mis-aligned outputs where the model generates logically incorrect code that developers might deploy.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The data pipeline, vector stores, and training/RAG sources for the auditing assistant are not detailed. Potential risks include data exfiltration of proprietary, non-open-source bytecode uploaded by users, and poisoning of the reference knowledge base.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework for the chatbot and decompilation pipeline is unspecified. Risks include insecure tool integration if the chatbot can trigger compiler tools or execute test environments on behalf of the user.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

SuiGPT utilizes edge functions for parallel function processing and decompilation. Threats include edge environment compromise, resource exhaustion (DoS) during heavy decompilation tasks, and insecure API endpoints exposing the decompilation engine.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of real-time monitoring, guardrails, or evaluation metrics to verify the accuracy of the chatbot's audit advice, creating blind spots where incorrect security recommendations go undetected.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No compliance certifications, identity management, or access control policies are detailed for the web interface or API, leaving potential gaps in user data protection and authorization.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While no multi-agent interactions are described, the platform features a 'Community Forum' which introduces social ecosystem risks, such as users sharing backdoored decompiled code or malicious audit insights.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.