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TrustCenter | SecurityQuestionnaire — agentic threat model

6.4AIVSS 6.4 · Medium

The agent poses a moderate-to-high risk due to its handling of highly sensitive corporate compliance and security data. While mitigated by human-in-the-loop review workflows, a compromise could lead to the exposure of internal security vulnerabilities or the distribution of falsified compliance certifications.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.5AARS uplift 0.55Factor sum 2.2/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×0.8
Autonomy of Action
0.30
Goal-Driven Planning
0.20
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.10
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.40
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.30

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes commercial LLMs via API. Primary threats include prompt injection that could bypass NDA gating workflows or cause the model to hallucinate incorrect security controls in questionnaire responses.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

The agent ingests highly sensitive data including past questionnaires, compliance docs, policies, and certifications. Key threats include data poisoning (uploading false policies to alter future answers) and unauthorized exfiltration of proprietary security documentation.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely uses a standard RAG framework to match questionnaire queries with past answers. Threats include insecure document parsing and indirect prompt injection via maliciously formatted questionnaire files uploaded for processing.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted as a SaaS solution by Sprinto. The primary threat is multi-tenant isolation failure, which could allow unauthorized users to access another organization's private compliance vault or draft questionnaires.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no explicit mention of guardrails or evaluation frameworks. Gaps here could lead to undetected drift in security posture answers or silent failures in parsing complex questionnaire formats.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)✓ mapped

The agent features gated access with NDA workflows and team collaboration with question assignment & review. This provides built-in access control and human-in-the-loop verification, mitigating compliance risks before publishing.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates as a standalone horizontal SaaS tool with no explicit multi-agent or marketplace integrations mentioned.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.