Windsurf — agentic threat model
Windsurf is a highly capable agentic IDE with deep system access (file editing, terminal execution), presenting a high-risk profile if malicious codebases or prompt injections hijack its autonomous execution capabilities.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.30 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.90 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.60 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.30 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — uses proprietary or third-party foundation models which are susceptible to prompt injection, adversarial reprogramming, and model-based evasion.
Not certain from the listing — likely indexes local codebases and repositories into a vector store, creating risks of local data poisoning or exfiltration via malicious files.
Not certain from the listing — orchestrates multi-step coding tasks, file modifications, and terminal commands, presenting high risks of tool misuse or prompt-injection-driven command execution.
Not certain from the listing — runs locally on developer machines or in remote containers, where lack of strict sandboxing could allow arbitrary code execution to compromise the host system.
Not certain from the listing — requires robust logging of agent-initiated terminal commands and file changes to prevent silent, malicious modifications.
Not certain from the listing — compliance posture regarding telemetry, code privacy, and intellectual property protection is not detailed.
Not certain from the listing — potential integration with external developer tools, APIs, or IDE extensions could introduce supply chain vulnerabilities.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.