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← Yamete.gg

Yamete.gg — agentic threat model

7.8AIVSS 7.8 · High

Yamete.gg presents low agentic risk regarding autonomous system execution, but poses severe privacy and data security risks due to its collection and long-term storage of highly sensitive, personal NSFW chat histories and user-generated prompts.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.5AARS uplift 1.33Factor sum 3.8/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.10
Goal-Driven Planning
0.10
Self-Modification
0.20
Dynamic Tool Use
0.30
Persistent Memory
0.80
Contextual Awareness
0.50
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.80
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.70

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the underlying LLMs and image generation models are proprietary or undisclosed. Primary threats include model reprogramming, adversarial prompt injection, and intellectual property theft of custom-tuned NSFW weights.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the architecture of the 'extended memory system' and vector stores is unknown. The primary threat is data exfiltration or unauthorized access to highly sensitive, personal user chat histories and custom character configurations.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — the orchestration framework managing 'Studio Mode' and character state is proprietary. Threats include prompt injection to manipulate character behavior beyond intended boundaries or bypass platform limitations.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosting, sandboxing, and infrastructure details are undisclosed. Potential threats include server-side request forgery (SSRF) through the image generation engine and resource exhaustion on GPU clusters.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of monitoring, logging, or safety guardrails, as the platform explicitly advertises 'uncensored' interactions. This creates a blind spot for detecting malicious abuse or data harvesting.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — compliance with privacy regulations (such as GDPR/CCPA) regarding intimate user data, age verification mechanisms, and data deletion rights is not detailed.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

The agent operates as a closed, standalone platform with isolated chat rooms and does not interact with external agent marketplaces or third-party agent ecosystems, minimizing multi-agent cascading risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.