Agentflow — agentic threat model
Agentflow presents a high-risk profile due to its support for custom JavaScript actions and dynamic control flow (loops/branching) driven by natural language, which could be exploited via prompt injection to achieve arbitrary code execution. As an open-source developer framework, it lacks built-in sandboxing or guardrails, shifting the entire security burden to the implementer.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Provider-agnostic framework supporting both local and cloud-based foundation models. Primary threats include prompt injection and reprogramming, where malicious inputs could manipulate the Markdown-based logical branching or loops.
Not certain from the listing — the framework does not explicitly detail built-in vector stores or RAG pipelines, but data operations would depend on custom JS actions or the chosen model provider.
Core vulnerability layer. The framework orchestrates workflows using natural language and Markdown with loops/conditions, and supports custom JavaScript actions. This creates a high risk of insecure tool integration, prompt-driven logic bypasses, and arbitrary code execution if inputs to JS tools are not strictly sanitized.
Not certain from the listing — deployment is self-hosted (local or developer-managed infrastructure via CLI/TypeScript API), meaning sandboxing of the custom JS actions and CLI execution environment is entirely up to the user.
Not certain from the listing — no explicit mention of built-in evaluation, logging, or guardrails, leaving a potential blind spot unless integrated via the TypeScript API.
Not certain from the listing — as an open-source framework, security controls, identity management, and compliance alignment are the responsibility of the deploying developer.
Not certain from the listing — focuses on single-agent workflows and custom JS tools rather than a multi-agent ecosystem or marketplace interactions.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).