AgentStamp — agentic threat model
AgentStamp acts as a critical security and identity layer for multi-agent ecosystems; a compromise of its registry or cryptographic verification SDKs could allow malicious agents to spoof identities, bypass API gates, and exploit A2A trust relationships.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.50 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.40 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.30 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.80 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.90 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.20 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — AgentStamp is an identity registry and SDK rather than a foundation model. It integrates with external LLMs like Claude via MCP tools, but does not host or train its own models.
Not certain from the listing — The platform manages reputation data, cryptographic stamps, and heartbeat logs, but there is no explicit mention of vector databases, RAG pipelines, or training data operations.
Provides 14 MCP tools for Claude/AI assistant integration and SDKs (npm/Python). Threats include insecure tool integration, manipulation of MCP tool outputs, or bypasses in the middleware SDKs.
Not certain from the listing — While it utilizes the Base L2 blockchain for USDC micropayments, the hosting infrastructure for the registry API, SDK distribution, and backend services is not detailed.
Features heartbeat-based uptime tracking and a 0-100 trust score with time-decay. Threats include trust score gaming, sybil endorsements, and spoofed heartbeats to artificially maintain high reputation scores.
Implements strong security controls including Ed25519 cryptographic stamps, ERC-8004 compatibility, and `requireStamp()` middleware for Express/Hono. Threats include private key compromise, smart contract vulnerabilities on Base, and cryptographic implementation flaws.
Specifically designed for Agent-to-Agent (A2A) trust and passport protocols (A2A v0.3). Threats include rogue agents obtaining high-tier stamps, cascading trust failures across integrated services, and marketplace reputation manipulation.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).