AutoGPT — agentic threat model
AutoGPT presents an extremely high risk profile due to its combination of full autonomy, internet access, and arbitrary code execution capabilities without built-in sandboxing or guardrails mentioned in the listing.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.90 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.90 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.90 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.70 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.30 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.40 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.80 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.70 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Uses GPT-4 as its foundation model. Highly vulnerable to prompt injection, goal hijacking, and indirect prompt injection via web-browsing, which can redirect its autonomous execution loops.
Not certain from the listing — the description mentions internet access for information gathering but does not detail its vector database, memory storage, or RAG architecture, leaving it vulnerable to data poisoning via untrusted web content.
As an autonomous framework, it orchestrates planning, memory, and tool calling. It possesses high risk of tool misuse and insecure tool integration, particularly because it can autonomously write and execute code to achieve goals.
Not certain from the listing — the deployment environment and sandboxing controls for executing the generated code are not specified, posing extreme risks of host compromise and privilege escalation if run unsandboxed.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of built-in guardrails, real-time monitoring, or evaluation frameworks to detect, log, or intercept malicious or unintended autonomous actions.
Not certain from the listing — no identity, authorization, policy enforcement, or compliance governance mechanisms are described for managing agent permissions.
Not certain from the listing — while it acts as an autonomous agent, the listing does not detail multi-agent coordination or marketplace interactions, though cascading failures remain a risk if it spawns sub-agents.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).