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coachcall.ai — agentic threat model

8.2AIVSS 8.2 · High

coachcall.ai presents a moderate security risk primarily due to its direct access to communication channels (voice calls and WhatsApp) and its retention of sensitive personal data. A compromise could enable highly convincing social engineering, vishing, or privacy breaches.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.5AARS uplift 1.72Factor sum 4.9/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.70
Goal-Driven Planning
0.40
Self-Modification
0.20
Dynamic Tool Use
0.60
Persistent Memory
0.80
Contextual Awareness
0.60
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.60

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely relies on commercial LLMs combined with text-to-speech and speech-to-text models. Key threats include prompt injection via voice or WhatsApp that could hijack the agent's persona or cause it to generate inappropriate outputs.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — stores user goals, conversation history, and progress over time. Threats include unauthorized access to this sensitive personal data, lack of encryption at rest, and potential data poisoning of the long-term memory store.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates scheduling, voice calls, and WhatsApp messaging. Threats include insecure tool integration with telephony/messaging APIs and memory poisoning where malicious user inputs alter the agent's long-term behavior.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — requires integration with telephony providers (e.g., Twilio) and WhatsApp Business API. Threats include API key exposure, insecure webhook endpoints, and lack of sandboxing for user-specific session data.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no mention of monitoring or guardrails for voice/text outputs. Threats include blind spots in detecting inappropriate or harmful advice generated during voice calls.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — handles highly personal data and voice/phone communications without explicit mention of privacy compliance (e.g., GDPR, CCPA) or robust authentication.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates primarily as a standalone B2C agent. Threats of multi-agent cascading failures are low, but integration with external calendars/scheduling tools presents minor ecosystem risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).