Codex Reset Radar — agentic threat model
The Codex Reset Radar is a low-risk monitoring and forecasting agent. Its primary security exposures are limited to potential data poisoning of its historical tracking sources and the risk of spoofed or malicious email notifications if the alerting mechanism is compromised.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.00 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.00 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.00 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying model is likely used for summarizing public announcements and generating reset forecasts. It faces risks of prompt injection if untrusted public announcements are ingested directly without sanitization.
Not certain from the listing — The agent relies on historical reset data and public announcements. If these data sources are poisoned, the forecasting accuracy will degrade, leading to incorrect planning guidance for developers.
Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework likely manages scheduled polling of Codex limits and triggers email alerts. Vulnerabilities could include insecure handling of notification dispatch logic.
Not certain from the listing — The deployment environment must securely store secrets such as email API keys and Codex monitoring credentials. Compromise of this layer could lead to unauthorized access to subscriber email lists.
Not certain from the listing — Observability is needed to track the accuracy of the reset forecasts and monitor for anomalies in the incoming public announcement feeds.
Not certain from the listing — The agent collects user emails for notifications, necessitating compliance with data privacy regulations (e.g., GDPR/CCPA) and secure opt-in/opt-out mechanisms.
Not certain from the listing — The agent appears to operate independently without multi-agent orchestration, presenting minimal ecosystem-specific risk.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology — every score is re-derived by the same automated method as an agent's public evidence changes.