DeepSwapAI — agentic threat model
DeepSwapAI is a single-purpose media processing utility with zero agentic capabilities, such as autonomy, planning, or tool use. Its primary security risks are non-agentic, focusing on data privacy, biometric data compliance, and potential misuse for generating non-consensual deepfakes.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.00 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.00 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.00 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.20 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying face-swapping models (likely GANs or diffusion-based architectures) are vulnerable to adversarial inputs designed to bypass safety filters, model extraction attacks, or reconstruction of training data.
Processes user-uploaded photos, videos, and GIFs. The primary threat is unauthorized access to or exfiltration of sensitive user-uploaded media and biometric face references before the 24-hour automatic deletion occurs.
The tool does not utilize an agentic framework, orchestration layer, or dynamic tool execution. Threats related to prompt injection, tool misuse, or memory poisoning are not applicable.
Not certain from the listing — The web-based hosting infrastructure faces threats of resource exhaustion (denial of service) due to computationally heavy video processing, and potential server-side request forgery (SSRF) if media can be uploaded via external URLs.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of automated guardrails or input validation to detect and block the upload of copyrighted material, CSAM, or non-consensual imagery of public figures.
Not certain from the listing — Processing and mapping human faces introduces severe compliance risks under biometric privacy laws (such as BIPA, GDPR, and CCPA) if explicit user consent and audit trails are not maintained.
The tool operates strictly as a standalone web utility with no multi-agent interactions, marketplace integrations, or external agent-to-agent communication channels.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology — every score is re-derived by the same automated method as an agent's public evidence changes.