Doable — agentic threat model
Doable presents a moderate-to-high risk profile due to its deep integration into web applications via a single line of code, granting it access to DOM elements, forms, and user workflows. A compromise or prompt injection attack could lead to unauthorized data exfiltration or arbitrary workflow execution on behalf of users.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.50 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.60 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.30 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely relies on third-party LLMs to interpret user intent and generate form-filling actions. Threats include prompt injection that could hijack the model's output to insert malicious payloads into form fields.
Not certain from the listing — processes real-time user inputs and DOM context. Threats include the exposure of sensitive PII or credentials entered into automated forms, and potential data exfiltration if the backend logs or stores this transactional data insecurely.
The agent orchestrates multi-step workflows and form-filling based on natural language commands. Threats include tool misuse where malicious commands trigger unintended workflows, and insecure tool integration allowing DOM-based cross-site scripting (XSS) via automated inputs.
Not certain from the listing — integrates via a single line of code (likely a JavaScript SDK) pointing to a cloud backend. Threats include supply chain attacks targeting the hosted JS library, CDN compromise, and unauthorized API access to the orchestration backend.
Not certain from the listing — no monitoring, logging, or guardrail mechanisms are described. Threats include a lack of visibility into anomalous workflow executions or prompt injection attempts, leading to undetected abuse.
Not certain from the listing — no compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2, GDPR) or authorization policies are mentioned. Threats include privilege escalation if the agent executes workflows that the active user is not authorized to perform.
Not certain from the listing — primarily functions as a horizontal utility within a single host application. Threats include cascading failures if the automated workflows trigger external APIs or third-party integrations without proper validation.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).