Ellipsis AI — agentic threat model
Ellipsis AI presents a high-risk profile due to its direct write access to code repositories and integration into CI/CD workflows, making it a high-value target for supply chain attacks if compromised.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.60 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.70 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.40 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.80 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.50 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.30 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation models used for code generation and review are not disclosed. Threats include prompt injection leading to malicious code generation or bypassing style/security rules.
Not certain from the listing — The agent ingests proprietary codebases, PR history, and style guides. Gaps in data lineage or unauthorized access to the codebase vector store could lead to intellectual property exfiltration.
Not certain from the listing — The orchestration framework is proprietary. Insecure tool integration with GitHub/GitLab APIs could allow an attacker to manipulate PRs or execute unauthorized repository actions.
Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment and sandboxing mechanisms for running code reviews or test executions are not detailed, posing risks of container escape or lateral movement if malicious code is processed.
Not certain from the listing — Internal monitoring and guardrails to detect hallucinated or malicious code suggestions before they are committed to PRs are not specified.
Not certain from the listing — While it is a paid tool, specific compliance certifications (e.g., SOC 2) or granular OAuth permission controls are not explicitly detailed in the directory listing.
Not certain from the listing — The agent operates within the GitHub/GitLab ecosystem alongside other CI/CD bots. Risks include cascading failures or trust abuse if another integrated bot is compromised.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).