excel-automation — agentic threat model
This agent presents a high risk profile due to its ability to execute arbitrary Python and AppleScript on macOS, coupled with parsing complex, potentially untrusted financial spreadsheets, creating a direct path to local system compromise if inputs are not strictly sanitized.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.80 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.60 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.90 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.20 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.20 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.50 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — No specific foundation models are mentioned. If the underlying LLM is susceptible to prompt injection, an attacker could manipulate the generated Python or AppleScript code.
Reads and writes local spreadsheet files and parses XML/ZIP structures, creating risks of XML External Entity (XXE) injection, zip slip, or malicious macro execution when processing untrusted investment-bank models.
Executes Python scripts (openpyxl) and AppleScript commands to control Excel windows, presenting a critical risk of arbitrary code execution or UI manipulation if the orchestration framework fails to sanitize inputs.
Runs locally on macOS to control Excel windows via AppleScript, meaning a compromise of the agent could lead directly to local user privilege escalation, unauthorized local file system access, or keystroke injection.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of logging, guardrails, or execution monitoring to detect malicious AppleScript payloads or anomalous file system activity.
Not certain from the listing — No authentication, authorization, or compliance controls are described, suggesting the agent runs with the full permissions of the host user.
As a community agent skill, it is designed to be integrated into larger agentic workflows, risking cascading failures if parent agents pass untrusted inputs to its execution environment.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).