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Extruct AI — agentic threat model

8.4AIVSS 8.4 · High

Extruct AI presents a moderate-to-high risk profile primarily driven by its integration with external CRMs and live web-scraping capabilities, which expose it to indirect prompt injection and sensitive data exfiltration.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 7.5AARS uplift 0.95Factor sum 3.8/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.40
Goal-Driven Planning
0.50
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.60
Persistent Memory
0.30
Contextual Awareness
0.50
Dynamic Identity
0.20
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely relies on third-party foundation models to synthesize company research. The primary threat is indirect prompt injection from untrusted web content scraped during live research, leading to manipulated outputs.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — processes live web data and CRM records. Threats include data poisoning from malicious web pages designed to corrupt the research database, and potential data exfiltration of ingested CRM data.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — orchestrates multi-step search queries and table enrichment. Insecure tool integration with CRM APIs could allow an attacker to abuse the agent's write permissions via prompt injection.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — hosted as a SaaS platform with API access. Key threats include insecure storage of user CRM credentials/API keys and potential container escape if the scraping engine is not properly sandboxed.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no observability or guardrail mechanisms are mentioned. A lack of real-time monitoring for prompt injection or anomalous API activity increases the risk of silent exploitation.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — handles sensitive corporate and CRM data but does not explicitly state compliance certifications (e.g., SOC 2, GDPR). Weak access controls on the API could lead to unauthorized data access.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — operates primarily as a single-agent utility integrated with external APIs rather than a multi-agent ecosystem, minimizing agent-to-agent trust risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).