FloorPlanBot — agentic threat model
FloorPlanBot exhibits a very low agentic risk profile due to its lack of autonomy, planning, and tool execution capabilities. Its primary risks are limited to standard web application vulnerabilities, such as insecure file handling of uploaded/downloaded images and potential abuse of paid credits.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.00 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.00 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.70 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.00 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes a third-party text-to-image or image-to-image foundation model. Primary threats include adversarial prompt injection to bypass safety filters and generate inappropriate content, as well as inherent model hallucinations regarding structural measurements.
Not certain from the listing — handles user-uploaded floor plans and room photos. Threats include unauthorized access to or exfiltration of these private user images, and potential data privacy issues if uploaded images are used for downstream model training without consent.
The agent lacks complex orchestration, planning, or memory frameworks. It operates on a simple single-turn request-response model, meaning threats related to tool misuse, recursive loops, or memory poisoning are virtually non-existent.
Not certain from the listing — likely hosted on standard cloud infrastructure. Key threats include vulnerabilities in the image processing libraries used for editing and PDF/PNG generation, which could lead to remote code execution or server-side resource exhaustion.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of input/output guardrails or logging mechanisms. The main threat is a lack of content moderation on user-submitted text prompts and uploaded images.
Integrates Google sign-in for authentication and manages paid credits. Security controls must protect against credit theft or bypass of the payment gateway, while compliance must address GDPR/CCPA regarding user-uploaded photos of private residences.
The agent does not participate in any multi-agent ecosystem, marketplace, or autonomous agent-to-agent communication, eliminating risks associated with cascading agent failures or trust abuse.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology — every score is re-derived by the same automated method as an agent's public evidence changes.