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← Genjutsu AI

Genjutsu AI — agentic threat model

4.4AIVSS 4.4 · Medium

Genjutsu AI is a low-risk, single-purpose generative content tool with zero agentic autonomy, planning, or tool-use capabilities. Its primary security risks are limited to prompt injection for content filter bypass (e.g., generating deepfakes or NSFW media) and credit-theft/billing abuse.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 4.3AARS uplift 0.36Factor sum 0.7/10Threat ×0.9Mitigation ×0.95
Autonomy of Action
0.00
Goal-Driven Planning
0.00
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.00
Persistent Memory
0.00
Contextual Awareness
0.00
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.70
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.00

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models✓ mapped

Uses Seedance 2.0, Seedance 2.0 Fast, and GPT Image 2. Primary threats include prompt injection to bypass safety filters (leading to NSFW, copyright-infringing, or deepfake generation) and model output misalignment.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No details are provided about training data, vector stores, or RAG. Potential threats include poisoning of downstream caches or exfiltration of user-uploaded reference images if supported.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

The agent framework is minimal or non-existent, with no planning, memory, or tool calling. Threats are extremely low, limited to basic prompt routing and credit validation logic.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment (cloud/SaaS) is unspecified. Standard web application threats apply, such as container compromise, API key exposure for third-party models, and credit-system bypasses.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — No mention of guardrails, output filtering, or logging. Lack of input/output moderation could allow generation of harmful, copyrighted, or deepfake content.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Identity and access management details are omitted beyond basic user accounts. Compliance risks include copyright infringement of generated media and lack of clear data retention policies.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

No multi-agent or marketplace interactions are supported. Threat is negligible as it operates as an isolated single-user tool.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology — every score is re-derived by the same automated method as an agent's public evidence changes.