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Get Face Report — agentic threat model

4.0AIVSS 4.0 · Medium

Get Face Report is a low-risk consumer web application with minimal agentic capabilities, presenting primarily privacy risks related to user-uploaded facial photos rather than autonomous execution or system compromise.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 4.3AARS uplift 0.67Factor sum 1.3/10Threat ×0.9Mitigation ×0.8
Autonomy of Action
0.20
Goal-Driven Planning
0.00
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.00
Persistent Memory
0.10
Contextual Awareness
0.10
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.00
Non-Determinism
0.50
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.40

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes lightweight on-device computer vision models for basic measurements and cloud-based models for paid styling reports. Primary threats include adversarial image inputs designed to spoof measurements or model extraction of proprietary styling logic.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

Data operations are split: free scans remain on-device, while paid reports store photos privately until deletion. The main threat is unauthorized access to or leakage of stored biometric/facial photos on the backend before they are deleted.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

No agent orchestration framework, planning, memory, or tool-calling capabilities are utilized. Consequently, agent-specific framework threats like prompt injection-based tool misuse or memory poisoning are not applicable.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — paid features require cloud hosting to process and store photos. Threats include standard web application vulnerabilities, insecure cloud storage buckets, and lack of secure sandboxing for server-side image processing.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of model observability, bias monitoring, or input validation guardrails to prevent processing of non-face or malicious image payloads.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — while the app claims private storage and deletion, it lacks explicit details regarding compliance with biometric privacy regulations (such as BIPA, GDPR, or CCPA) or external security audits.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

The application operates entirely in isolation with no multi-agent coordination, external APIs, or marketplace integrations, resulting in zero exposure to ecosystem-level threats.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).

These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology — every score is re-derived by the same automated method as an agent's public evidence changes.