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GoNoGo — agentic threat model

7.5AIVSS 7.5 · High

GoNoGo is a low-autonomy, decision-support AI agent that poses moderate security risks primarily centered around the exposure of highly sensitive proprietary data (RFPs, past proposals, and business rules) rather than active execution risks.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.5AARS uplift 0.98Factor sum 2.8/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.20
Goal-Driven Planning
0.30
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.20
Persistent Memory
0.50
Contextual Awareness
0.60
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.40
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.50

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes commercial or open-source LLMs for RFP text extraction and reasoning. Primary threats include indirect prompt injection via malicious text embedded in uploaded RFPs designed to force a 'Go' decision, and potential data leakage to model providers.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

The tool heavily relies on ingestion of highly sensitive corporate data, including past proposals, deal history, and business rules. Key threats include data exfiltration of proprietary IP and knowledge-base poisoning, where malicious historical data could skew future bid/no-bid decisions.

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — likely uses a lightweight RAG orchestration framework. Threats include insecure document parsing (e.g., XML external entity attacks or buffer overflows via malicious PDF/DOCX uploads) and logic bypass of defined business rules via prompt manipulation.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — as an open-source or hosted standalone tool, infrastructure security depends on deployment. Threats include insecure file upload directories, lack of container sandboxing for document processing, and unauthorized access to the underlying vector database.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no observability or evaluation mechanisms are detailed. Gaps here could lead to undetected drift in decision-making quality or silent failures in parsing complex RFP tables and requirements.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of role-based access control (RBAC), encryption standards, or compliance certifications (e.g., SOC2). This is a significant concern given the confidentiality requirements of RFPs and corporate deal histories.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

The tool is positioned as a standalone utility with 'no integrations required,' meaning ecosystem and multi-agent risks are currently negligible. However, future integrations with CRMs (like Salesforce) could introduce cascading trust and data-leakage risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).