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graph-query (AI Maestro) — agentic threat model

6.8AIVSS 6.8 · Medium

The graph-query skill presents a moderate risk profile, primarily acting as an informational tool for codebase analysis. Its main hazards stem from potential IP exposure of local codebases and the risk of generating misleading blast-radius assessments that could lead other agents to perform destructive modifications.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.1AARS uplift 1.4Factor sum 3.6/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×0.9
Autonomy of Action
0.30
Goal-Driven Planning
0.40
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.50
Persistent Memory
0.20
Contextual Awareness
0.70
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.60
Non-Determinism
0.40
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.30

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — relies on the underlying AI Maestro orchestrator's configured LLM; threats include prompt injection altering query generation or reasoning about blast radius.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

Accesses indexed codebase metadata and relationships via a local graph database; threats include codebase poisoning (malicious code structure tricking the graph) or unauthorized access to sensitive IP/code structures.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Integrates as a skill within AI Maestro; risks include insecure tool integration where graph queries could be manipulated to execute arbitrary database commands or return misleading dependency maps.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

Runs locally on the developer's machine or local environment; threats include local privilege escalation if the tool executes arbitrary local commands, or unauthorized local file system access.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — no explicit mention of logging or guardrails for query execution; blind spots in query validation could allow malicious inputs to bypass checks.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — being an open-source local tool, it likely inherits the host system's permissions without independent access controls or audit logging.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

Part of the AI Maestro suite (multi-agent/skill ecosystem); risks include cascading failures if another compromised agent consumes incorrect blast-radius analysis to make destructive code modifications.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).