MyVibe — agentic threat model
MyVibe introduces significant agentic risk by allowing a terminal-based agent (Claude Code) to execute one-command deployments to live hosting, creating a direct vector for automated credential exposure and unauthorized code execution.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.60 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.30 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — relies on the underlying Claude Code foundation model (likely Claude 3.5 Sonnet). Vulnerable to prompt injection that could force the model to run the deployment command with malicious payloads.
Not certain from the listing — the agent reads local project files to package them for deployment. If malicious files or sensitive environment variables are present in the workspace, they may be exfiltrated during the publishing process.
The plugin exposes a high-risk tool (/myvibe:publish) within the Claude Code framework. Insecure tool integration or lack of strict user confirmation before execution could allow an attacker to trigger unauthorized deployments via indirect prompt injection.
High risk. The plugin handles hosting and publishing directly from the terminal. This introduces deployment/credential surface, potentially exposing API keys, hosting tokens, or allowing container escape if the hosted environment is poorly sandboxed.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of deployment guardrails, logging of published payloads, or monitoring for malicious code within the deployed projects.
Not certain from the listing — lacks visible authentication, authorization, or policy controls to restrict who (or what agentic prompt) can trigger the /myvibe:publish command and where the credentials are securely stored.
Operates as a plugin within the Claude Code ecosystem. If another agent or tool compromises the terminal session, it can abuse MyVibe to instantly publish and host malicious sites or command-and-control endpoints.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).