security-sweep — agentic threat model

Not certain from the listing — The plugin relies on Claude Code's underlying LLM (likely Claude 3.5 Sonnet) for AI-specific vulnerability checks. Threats include prompt injection within scanned files that could manipulate the scanner's output or cause the model to ignore actual vulnerabilities.

The plugin directly accesses and processes local source code, configuration files, and potentially hardcoded secrets. Threats include data exfiltration of intellectual property or sensitive credentials if the plugin or its dependencies are compromised.

As a Claude Code plugin, it integrates directly into the agent's tool-calling framework. Threats include insecure tool integration where malicious codebase inputs could exploit the plugin's parser, leading to command injection or unauthorized file reads within the parent framework.

Not certain from the listing — The plugin runs locally within the user's terminal environment via Claude Code. Threats include local privilege escalation or unauthorized filesystem traversal if the execution environment lacks strict containerization or sandboxing.

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, evaluation guardrails, or telemetry. This creates blind spots regarding what files were scanned and whether the scan results were tampered with or leaked.

Not certain from the listing — The plugin lacks explicit authentication, authorization, or policy enforcement mechanisms of its own, relying entirely on the host system's user permissions and Claude Code's configuration.

The plugin exists within the Claude Code plugin ecosystem. Threats include supply chain attacks, such as malicious updates to the open-source repository or dependency confusion, which could compromise the host agent and the developer's machine.