AgentReadyHomeAgent Listing

← shadcn-ui-skills

shadcn-ui-skills — agentic threat model

3.8AIVSS 3.8 · Low

The shadcn-ui-skills agent acts as a static context provider and pattern enforcer for UI generation, presenting a very low agentic risk posture due to its lack of execution capabilities, autonomy, or stateful memory.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 3.3AARS uplift 0.54Factor sum 0.9/10Threat ×0.9Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.00
Goal-Driven Planning
0.00
Self-Modification
0.00
Dynamic Tool Use
0.10
Persistent Memory
0.00
Contextual Awareness
0.30
Dynamic Identity
0.00
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.20
Non-Determinism
0.20
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.10

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The agent relies on an external coding agent's underlying LLM. The primary threat is prompt injection or adversarial examples that bypass the shadcn pattern enforcement to generate malformed or malicious UI code.

L2 · Data Operations✓ mapped

The agent provides reference context and design patterns for shadcn/ui components. The main threat is data poisoning of the reference documentation or CLI-distributed instruction set, leading to the generation of vulnerable UI code (e.g., XSS vulnerabilities in generated components).

L3 · Agent Frameworks⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The agent appears to function as a skill/plugin package rather than a standalone orchestrator. Framework risks depend entirely on the host coding agent integrating these skills, such as insecure tool execution during CLI-based component installation.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure✓ mapped

The skills are distributed via the shadcn CLI and documentation. Infrastructure threats include supply chain attacks targeting the CLI distribution channel or npm registry, which could compromise developer workstations during installation.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in logging, telemetry, or guardrails to verify if the generated UI code conforms to security best practices beyond structural design patterns.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The resource is open-source and free, with no explicit mention of access controls, licensing compliance checks, or audit logging for code generation activities.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem✓ mapped

The agent is designed to inject skills into other coding agents. A compromised skill package could act as a vector for downstream cascading failures, causing multiple developer agents to generate insecure code across various projects.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).