skill-creator — agentic threat model
The skill-creator agent presents a moderate-to-high risk profile due to its capability to generate, modify, and execute code (skills and evaluation harnesses) on the host system. A compromise could lead to downstream supply-chain attacks through the silent injection of malicious payloads into generated skills.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.40 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.50 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.70 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.60 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.40 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.30 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Relies on Anthropic foundation models to generate, optimize, and evaluate skill code. Vulnerable to prompt injection that could bias skill generation or inject malicious code into scaffolded outputs.
Handles local codebase files, skill folders, and evaluation datasets. Risks include unauthorized access to sensitive local code or poisoning of evaluation datasets to mask malicious skill behavior.
Orchestrates the creation and optimization of tools/skills. Insecure tool integration or logic flaws in the framework could allow generated skills to execute unauthorized system commands during the evaluation phase.
Not certain from the listing — The execution environment for running evaluation harnesses and benchmarking is unspecified. If evals run in the host environment without strict containerization or sandboxing, it poses a severe risk of local privilege escalation or host compromise.
Features built-in evaluation and variance analysis. However, if the evaluation harness itself is compromised, it could report false positives or game the benchmarks to hide degraded or malicious skill performance.
Not certain from the listing — No explicit security controls, access policies, or compliance frameworks (like NIST or ISO) are mentioned for managing the execution of untrusted generated code.
Directly impacts the broader agent ecosystem by authoring and publishing new skills. A compromise here acts as a supply-chain threat, potentially distributing backdoored skills to other agents in the ecosystem.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).