solidity-security — agentic threat model
The solidity-security agent skill presents low direct operational risk due to its lack of autonomous execution or tool access, but carries high downstream risk if its reference patterns are poisoned to inject subtle vulnerabilities into smart contracts.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.10 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.20 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.10 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.10 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.30 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.40 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.30 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation model is not specified. Adversarial prompt injections could potentially bypass the injected security rules or cause the model to ignore the secure coding guidelines.
The skill relies on a static or dynamic catalog of secure Solidity patterns, worked examples, and checklists. If this knowledge base is poisoned or manipulated, the agent will confidently recommend insecure or backdoored code patterns to developers.
The skill injects instructions into the host agent's context. Vulnerabilities include context-stuffing limits where security guidelines are truncated, or prompt injection attacks that trick the host agent into ignoring the injected security rules.
Not certain from the listing — The deployment environment, hosting, and sandboxing of the agent executing this skill are not defined in the open-source directory listing.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in observability, logging, or automated guardrails to verify that the code generated under this skill's guidance actually complies with the security patterns.
Not certain from the listing — No compliance frameworks, access control mechanisms, or identity verification policies are detailed for this skill.
This skill is designed to be integrated into other agent workflows. A compromised host agent could abuse this trust relationship, claiming to use 'solidity-security' to validate code while actually deploying malicious or unverified smart contracts.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).