spec-driven-development — agentic threat model
This agent acts as a specification-drafting gatekeeper; its primary risk lies in downstream propagation of malicious or flawed specifications to code-generation agents if the gating mechanism is bypassed via prompt injection.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.60 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.20 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.40 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying foundation model is not specified, but it is susceptible to prompt injection that could bypass the specification gate or force the generation of malicious requirements.
Not certain from the listing — The skill processes user-provided requirements and vague ideas, but there is no mention of persistent vector stores or RAG data operations.
The agent framework implements a 'spec-before-code gate' orchestration. A key threat is framework bypass, where a user or downstream process circumvents the gate, or where the agent generates a spec containing hidden malicious instructions for a downstream code generator.
Not certain from the listing — As an open-source skill, deployment and sandboxing depend entirely on the host environment executing the addyosmani skill.
Not certain from the listing — There are no explicit evaluation, logging, or guardrail mechanisms mentioned to verify the safety or accuracy of the generated specifications.
Not certain from the listing — No security compliance, authentication, or authorization policies are described for this open-source skill.
The agent is designed to interface with coding workflows (potentially other coding agents). This creates an A2A trust abuse risk where a downstream developer agent blindly trusts and executes code based on the spec generated by this agent.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).