Stripe stripe-directory — agentic threat model
This agent acts as an informational router and directory for Stripe skills, presenting low direct risk but serving as a critical point of failure; compromise could lead to indirect risks through malicious skill routing or guidance manipulation.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.20 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.30 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.20 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.60 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.30 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.20 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation models used to drive the routing logic and task-to-guidance mapping are not disclosed, leaving model-level vulnerabilities (like adversarial reprogramming) unverified.
Focuses on Stripe's skill index and documentation lookup. Threats include data poisoning of the skill index or documentation source, which could lead to incorrect routing or the injection of malicious instructions into the agent's context.
Handles orchestration of skill routing. Vulnerabilities include prompt injection that manipulates the routing logic to redirect tasks to unauthorized or malicious skills, bypassing intended workflows.
Not certain from the listing — The hosting environment, sandboxing mechanisms, and network security controls for this directory skill are not detailed in the public listing.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of logging, monitoring, or evaluation guardrails to detect routing drift, anomalies, or malicious injection attempts.
Not certain from the listing — The directory does not specify any identity management, access controls, or compliance certifications governing how the skill index is updated or accessed.
Acts as a central router over Stripe's multi-agent skill ecosystem. A compromise here could lead to cascading failures across the entire suite of Stripe skills by mis-routing tasks or abusing trust boundaries between agents.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).