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Suna AI — agentic threat model

7.8AIVSS 7.8 · High

Suna AI is an open-source generalist agent designed for task automation like lead generation and trip planning. Its risk profile is moderate, driven by its multi-step planning and tool execution capabilities, but mitigated by its open-source nature which allows for local deployment and code auditing.

OWASP AIVSS score rationale

AIVSS = (CVSS_Base + AARS) × Mitigation_Factor, where AARS = (10 − CVSS_Base) × (Factor_Sum / 10) × ThM
CVSS base 6.5AARS uplift 1.26Factor sum 3.6/10Threat ×1.0Mitigation ×1.0
Autonomy of Action
0.50
Goal-Driven Planning
0.60
Self-Modification
0.10
Dynamic Tool Use
0.50
Persistent Memory
0.30
Contextual Awareness
0.40
Dynamic Identity
0.10
Multi-Agent Interactions
0.10
Non-Determinism
0.60
Opacity & Reflexivity
0.40

Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.

MAESTRO 7-layer threat model

Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.

L1 · Foundation Models⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The specific foundation models powering Suna AI are not disclosed, leaving it vulnerable to standard LLM risks like prompt injection, adversarial reprogramming, or output hallucination depending on the chosen backend.

L2 · Data Operations⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — The data architecture, vector database usage, and RAG implementation details are unspecified, posing potential risks of data exfiltration or knowledge-base poisoning if external data sources are integrated.

L3 · Agent Frameworks✓ mapped

Suna AI uses natural language workflows to automate tasks like lead generation and trip planning. This orchestration framework is susceptible to tool misuse or insecure tool integration if user inputs can manipulate the underlying API calls or web scraping functions.

L4 · Deployment & Infrastructure⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — As an open-source tool, deployment is highly dependent on the user's infrastructure. Without default sandboxing, running the agent locally or in a shared cloud environment could expose host systems to privilege escalation or unauthorized network access.

L5 · Evaluation & Observability⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in evaluation, logging, or guardrail frameworks to monitor agent decisions, potentially leading to blind spots during automated task execution.

L6 · Security & Compliance (cross-cutting)⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — Compliance certifications, identity management, and access control policies are not detailed, meaning security relies entirely on the deployer's manual configurations.

L7 · Agent Ecosystem⚠ not certain from listing

Not certain from the listing — While described as a generalist assistant, there is no explicit mention of multi-agent orchestration or marketplace integrations, limiting ecosystem-specific cascading failure risks.

MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).