Tattoo Forge — agentic threat model
Tattoo Forge exhibits a low-risk agentic profile, functioning primarily as a specialized, parameter-driven image generator with minimal autonomy or planning capabilities. The primary security concerns center on API abuse, prompt injection bypassing content filters, and the exposure of proprietary design metadata.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.10 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.10 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.10 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.50 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — likely utilizes a fine-tuned text-to-image foundation model (e.g., Stable Diffusion) with custom style adapters. Threats include adversarial prompt injection to bypass safety filters (generating offensive/NSFW content) and model extraction of proprietary style presets.
Not certain from the listing — stores prompt, style, and placement metadata alongside high-resolution PNG exports, and hosts a public inspiration feed. Threats include metadata poisoning, unauthorized scraping of user-generated designs, and potential injection of malicious payloads into metadata fields.
Not certain from the listing — orchestration appears to be a straightforward browser-based UI mapping sliders to model parameters rather than a complex agentic framework. Threats include insecure parameter handling or prompt injection manipulating the rendering pipeline.
Not certain from the listing — hosted as a browser-based application with an API. Threats include API key exposure, unauthorized consumption of paid generation credits, and standard web application vulnerabilities like cross-site scripting (XSS) in the browser interface.
Not certain from the listing — no mention of content moderation guardrails or output evaluation. Threats include a lack of automated detection for copyright-infringing or offensive generated content before it is published to the public inspiration feed.
Not certain from the listing — no explicit details on user authentication, access controls for the API, or data privacy compliance for user-uploaded prompts/metadata. Threats include weak API key management or lack of access controls on private designs.
Not certain from the listing — operates as a standalone vertical tool with an API, with no explicit multi-agent or marketplace integrations. Threats are minimal here, limited to third-party applications insecurely integrating its API.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).