← trailofbits-semgrep-rule-creator
trailofbits-semgrep-rule-creator — agentic threat model
This agent presents a low-to-moderate risk profile as its primary function is generating static Semgrep rule YAML files, though execution of these rules on local codebases requires careful sandboxing to prevent arbitrary code execution or source code exposure.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.30 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.40 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.10 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.30 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.20 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.50 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.10 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.60 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.40 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The underlying LLM is not specified. It is susceptible to prompt injection designed to generate bypasses in Semgrep rules or insert malicious patterns into the generated YAML.
Not certain from the listing — The agent relies on an instruction-and-example surface. If these examples or vulnerability patterns are poisoned, the agent will generate ineffective or overly permissive security rules.
The agent orchestrates rule generation and can run the generated YAML. Insecure tool integration could allow a maliciously crafted rule to exploit the Semgrep engine or execute arbitrary commands during rule validation.
Not certain from the listing — Since the agent runs Semgrep rules, it requires access to a runtime environment. If this environment is not sandboxed, running rules against untrusted code could lead to local file read or container compromise.
Not certain from the listing — There are no mentioned guardrails or logging mechanisms to detect if the agent is being used to systematically probe for rule bypasses or generate weak rules intentionally.
Not certain from the listing — No authentication, authorization, or compliance frameworks are specified for controlling who can author or execute these rules.
Not certain from the listing — No multi-agent interactions or marketplace integrations are described, limiting the risk of cascading failures or agent-to-agent trust abuse.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).