Yooiu — agentic threat model
Yooiu is a curated web directory with no autonomous capabilities, tool use, or persistent memory, presenting negligible agentic risk. The primary security concerns are traditional web vulnerabilities, such as malicious link submissions or database injection, rather than agent-specific threats.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.00 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.00 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.00 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.00 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.00 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.00 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.00 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.00 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.00 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — it is unclear if the directory utilizes a foundation model for search or categorization. If an LLM is used, threats are limited to basic prompt injection in search queries, but the system likely relies on standard database queries.
The primary data threat is data poisoning or integrity compromise via the public product submission feature, which could allow malicious actors to inject phishing links or malware-hosting URLs into the directory.
There is no active agent framework, orchestration, or memory management, eliminating threats related to tool misuse, planning failures, or memory poisoning.
Not certain from the listing — standard web infrastructure threats apply, including server misconfiguration, denial of service, and lack of transport layer security, but hosting details are omitted.
Not certain from the listing — there is no mention of input validation, submission moderation guardrails, or logging mechanisms to detect and block malicious submissions or search abuse.
Not certain from the listing — administrative access controls, submission review policies, and compliance with web security standards are not detailed in the public directory listing.
The system does not interact with other agents or operate within an agent ecosystem, meaning there is zero risk of multi-agent trust abuse or cascading agentic failures.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology — every score is re-derived by the same automated method as an agent's public evidence changes.