OpenMontage — agentic threat model
OpenMontage presents a high agentic risk due to its extensive toolset (52 tools, 500+ skills) and multi-step planning capabilities for video generation, which could be exploited for local code execution or malicious asset generation if the self-hosted environment is not properly sandboxed.
OWASP AIVSS score rationale
| Autonomy of Action | 0.70 | |
| Goal-Driven Planning | 0.80 | |
| Self-Modification | 0.20 | |
| Dynamic Tool Use | 0.80 | |
| Persistent Memory | 0.40 | |
| Contextual Awareness | 0.60 | |
| Dynamic Identity | 0.10 | |
| Multi-Agent Interactions | 0.50 | |
| Non-Determinism | 0.80 | |
| Opacity & Reflexivity | 0.60 |
Scored with the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula (AIVSS calculator reference); agentic risk factors estimated from the agent’s described capabilities.
MAESTRO 7-layer threat model
Per-layer threats for this agent. Layers tagged “not certain from listing” are general, caveated commentary where the public description didn’t pin that layer.
Not certain from the listing — The system likely relies on external LLMs and diffusion models for scripting, asset generation, and reasoning. These models are vulnerable to prompt injection, adversarial manipulation, and generating mis-aligned or copyrighted outputs.
Not certain from the listing — The agent builds a corpus from free stock footage and open archives. This introduces risks of data poisoning if malicious or copyrighted assets are ingested, alongside data provenance and lineage gaps.
With 12 pipelines, 52 tools, and 500+ agent skills, the orchestration framework is highly complex. Insecure tool integration or tool misuse within these pipelines could allow an attacker to hijack the video composition flow or execute unauthorized system commands.
Not certain from the listing — As an open-source GitHub project, deployment is likely self-hosted. If the rendering and execution environment is not strictly sandboxed, the agent's file-writing and media-processing tools could lead to host compromise or privilege escalation.
Not certain from the listing — There is no mention of built-in guardrails, content moderation, or logging mechanisms to monitor the 500+ agent skills, creating significant blind spots for drift or malicious output generation.
Not certain from the listing — The project is licensed under AGPL-3.0, but lacks documented access controls, identity management, or compliance frameworks, shifting all security responsibility to the end-user.
Not certain from the listing — While it features 500+ agent skills, it is unclear if these operate as independent multi-agent systems or a single monolithic framework. If multi-agent, cascading failures and trust abuse between skills are potential threats.
MAESTRO — the 7-layer agentic threat-modeling framework (Cloud Security Alliance / Ken Huang).
These scores are auto-generated from public information (the agent's own listing, docs, and repository) using the canonical OWASP AIVSS formula and the MAESTRO framework — an estimate for guidance, not a penetration test, audit, or certification. See the scoring methodology. Are you the vendor? Factual corrections are free.